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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the limitations, imposed by 
Regulation 28 of the Pension Funds Act, encourage optimal asset allocation and 
reduce investment risk for retirement savings when contrasted to discretionary 
investment. 
A quantitative risk and return analysis was performed using available data for 
Regulation 28 compliant funds and the Johannesburg Stock Exchange indices. The 
analysis considers two hypothetical investors who are identical in all regards other 
than their choice of investments. The model used a 40 year working and saving 
horizon, whereby the investors contribute a portion of their income to a retirement 
savings vehicle of their choice. The savings in these vehicles accumulate and earn real 
returns until retirement. The analysis uses a life-cycle model (Modigliani & Brumberg, 
1954) which accumulates capital to the retirement date and  retirement withdrawals 
that result in zero capital at the date of death, which is assumed to be 20 years post-
retirement. The model is used to analyse the differential return required in order to 
make investors indifferent between investing in a regulated product which is 
incentivised through tax credits.  
The findings indicate that Regulation 28 is effective in reducing the investment risk of 
retirement savings, however may also force the investor to sacrifice wealth. 
Discretionary investment may be preferential to an investor depending on the tax 
bracket the investor is in. Further, the complex calculations required to smooth 
consumption over the life cycle may contain too many variables for the ordinary 
individual to compute. 
This study is limited by assumptions regarding changes in future tax legislation, the 
time frame of investment returns for discretionary investment and retirement funds, 
inflation, investor career length and life expectancy. 
The research is novel as it determines a quantifiable excess return required from 
discretionary investment in order to make discretionary investment the preferred 
choice for retirement saving.  It provides a number of areas for future research that 
  
would aid in understanding the impact of each variable in a retirement saving and/or 
planning. The research has practical value to investment houses who offer both 
Regulation 28 compliant products and non-Regulation 28 compliant products; playing 
a role in offering financial advice.   
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1. Introduction 
Individual preferences may dictate the manner in which individuals choose to save for 
retirement. Previous studies have focussed on how individuals should save for 
retirement (Bodie & Treussard, 2007b; Pfau, 2010, 2011; Scholz, Seshadri, & 
Khitatrakun, 2006) and contrasted these to empirical evidence (Benartzi & Thaler, 
2007; Browning & Crossley, 2001; Gomes & Michaelides, 2005). To date, no literature 
exists that indicates whether the incentives provided in South African taxation 
legislation  coupled with regulation for retirement savings vehicles make sense from 
an economic and risk perspective . The purpose of this study is to determine whether 
or not the economic incentives provided in tax legislation encourage effective 
retirement saving. 
Relevant literature will be reviewed in chapter two, beginning with a review of 
theories of saving. This area will be furthered by investigation into human behaviour 
and optimal asset allocation. An understanding of the regulatory framework 
surrounding retirement saving in South Africa, and the relevant taxation legislation 
will be obtained.  
The findings from the literature review will inform the research questions stated in 
chapter 3, with the dual objective of determining whether Regulation 28 provides an 
effective tool for managing investment risk in retirement savings, and whether the 
coupled with the provisions of South African tax legislation create a strong incentive 
to save in Regulation 28 compliant vehicles. The method for determining these 
answers will also be explained. 
The results of the application of the method to the relevant data will be presented in 
Chapter 4. These results will be explained and discussed in detail. Chapter 5 will then 
set out the conclusions based on the results of chapter 4 and areas offering scope 
further research, together with recommendations will be detailed. 
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2. Literature Review 
Introduction 
Saving for retirement is an area that has been thoroughly researched in more recent 
periods (Behrman, Mitchell, Soo, & Bravo, 2012; Benartzi & Thaler, 2013; Gale, John, 
& Smith, 2012; Lusardi & Mitchell, 2011; Poterba & Wise, 2013). The primary reason 
for this is that most societies do not save enough and their citizens run out of money 
during retirement (Gokhale, 2000; Scholz et al., 2006; Skinner, 2007). This has caused 
growing uncertainty amongst the global society with regard to how retirement savings 
should be approached (Bernheim, Forni, Gokhale, & Kotlikoff, 2000; Bernheim, 2000); 
as it combines economics, finance and taxation into one area of life.  This area is clearly 
one that has generated significant interest, with the Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (‘OECD’) undertaking a study of economic policy 
regarding retirement saving and incentives in 2015.  
Areas that have been investigated include asset allocation, behavioural finance, 
retirement planning and financial literacy as well as the effectiveness of incentives in 
boosting retirement saving (Bernartzi & Thaler 2007; Costrell & McGee 2010; Buetler 
et al. 2005; Disney et al. 2008; Thaler & Benartzi 2007). In the South African context, 
there is limited research on retirement saving in any of these areas. The current 
proposed method for retirement saving is to invest in a pension, provident or 
retirement annuity fund. These funds are regulated investment vehicles which have 
specific rules and investment universes governed by Regulation 28 of the Pension 
Funds Act 24 of 1956. The goal of this research is to determine whether the current 
proposals to invest in Regulation 28 retirement funds are the best option or not. To 
do this it is necessary to present an illustration of the global understanding of the 
retirement saving puzzle whilst considering the South African regulatory environment 
and incentive structure.  
The relevant literature on savings, beginning with the Keynesian consumption 
function (Keynes, 1936), will be reviewed. Thereafter, behavioural biases present in 
retirement saving will be considered. The paper will then provide an overview of the 
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South African regulatory framework surrounding retirement savings, with a specific 
focus on regulation 28 and its limitations based on academic research of asset 
allocation.  Lastly, the effectiveness of savings incentives will be reviewed in detail. 
Theories of Saving 
In order to address the issue of saving for retirement, it is necessary to first discuss 
the major theories of saving. Under this section the original savings and consumption 
function (Keynes, 1936) will be contrasted to the life cycle hypothesis (Modigliani & 
Brumberg, 1954), and the permanent income hypothesis (Friedman, 1957). These 
theories have arisen out of contentions on how individuals allocate their resources 
between saving and consumption, with each theory having its own merits and pitfalls.   
The original savings and consumption function was proposed by Keynes (1936); a 
theory where households’ consumption was driven by real income, but an increase in 
real income would not result in the same increase in consumption (Keynes, 1936). This 
is known as the Keynesian consumption function. It implies that households have a 
marginal propensity to consume (and accordingly a propensity to save too); that a 1% 
increase in income would not necessarily result in a 1% increase in consumption, but 
rather a smaller than 1% increase in consumption (the marginal propensity to 
consume multiplied by the increase in income).  Accordingly, saving would increase by 
the portion of that 1% that is not used on consumption.  
Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) then proposed the life-cycle hypothesis (‘LCH’) of 
saving. Under this theory, consumers were assumed to be rational, utility-maximizing 
beings, and would therefore allocate their resources in order to achieve an optimal 
consumption pattern over the course of their life, which can be divided into several 
stages. The most basic models are the two- or three stage models. However, it is not 
necessary to confine the number of stages, as in reality there are often several stages 
in a life-cycle (Augusztinovics, 2000). This model thus asserts that the individual is 
aware of a lifetime budget constraint, and will use assets as a tool to shift consumption 
from one stage to another (Bodie, Treussard, & Willen, 2008). It is further proposed 
that a major drawback of life-cycle theory is that individuals are unable to predict 
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when random outcomes will occur, and thus, often, will not always be able to match 
their actual consumption with the planned consumption for that life-cycle stage 
(Bodie, Treussard, et al., 2008). An example of this would be unexpected health 
expenses (Hsu, 2011). 
The life-cycle theory is not without detractors (Altig, Auerbach, Kotlikoff, & Smetters, 
2001; Baranzini, 2005; Gourinchas, Parker, & Jan, 2007). It was the first theory of 
consumption that followed the Keynesian consumption function (Keynes, 1936). The 
criticisms include the absence of utility from a bequest motive, the fact that wealthier 
households tend to save more and the presence of data showing that younger people 
save more than is predicted by the life cycle hypothesis. This is not to say that the 
model under-predicts saving as a whole, but that in the earlier life-cycles individuals 
save more than the model predicts. The presence of this characteristic in empirical 
data is one of the major sources for criticism of the life cycle hypothesis (Baranzini, 
2005) . 
Modigliani (1986) argued that the bequest motive was overstated; as precautionary 
saving coupled with an earlier than expected death would result in a bequest that was 
not necessarily intentional. This is due because death is an uncertain event which 
cannot be accurately foreseen.  The potential reasons that younger households tend 
to save more could be better-educated individuals who command higher income than 
their predecessors (Baranzini, 2005). These types of individuals also tend to delay 
having offspring until later in life and are able to increasingly rely on their parents 
during their younger years (Baranzini, 2005). Whilst these detractors challenge issues 
with life cycle theory, none of them are able to offer sufficient evidence to entirely 
disprove the theory.  
If the Keynesian consumption function were adopted, rather than the life-cycle theory 
– as wealth increased - the value of savings would increase due to an increasing 
propensity to save; whereas under life-cycle theory, the individual’s would adjust their 
forward looking consumption and savings functions to account for this change.  
The savings behavior predicted by the life-cycle theory can be contrasted to the 
permanent income hypothesis (Friedman, 1957). Under the permanent income 
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hypothesis theory, consumption is a function of permanent income (anticipated 
income) and thus saving is a residual. This is to say that any short-term (‘transitory’) 
changes in income are unlikely to result in large changes in consumption, but rather 
additions to assets.  Friedman (1957) furthers the argument by considering that it is 
unlikely that an individual would save all unexpected increases in income, but would 
perhaps engage in “riotous living” with at least a portion of this transitory income. It 
should be noted that whilst not significantly different from the original life-cycle 
hypothesis, the permanent income hypothesis raises the point that saving is a function 
of consumption – that is to say that the individual determines what they will consume 
with no regard to how much of their income they need to save. Carroll (1997) 
interprets data collected by the Federal Reserve Board, which supports this in the 
sense that only 15% of households believed that preparing for retirement was the 
most important reason for saving; far surpassed by the 43% who would save for 
emergencies (‘precautionary saving’). 
Whilst all of these theories provide some degree of explanation as to how individuals 
save for retirement, none of the theories appear to be able to explain all factors. 
Thaler and Shefrin (1981) present an alternative economic theory, which 
encompasses behavioural aspects. Thaler and Shefrin (1981) propose that in each 
individual there are two personalities; a myopic doer and a farsighted planner. 
Individuals’ actions will thus result in a compromise between the interests of the doer 
and planner. Thus any utility the planner achieves from future consumption needs to 
equal the disutility experienced by the doer from deferring consumption. This could 
explain some of the anomalies in the life-cycle hypothesis, as an element of human 
behaviour can result in sub-optimal allocation of consumption.  A furtherance of the 
life-cycle model is provided by Shefrin and Thaler (1988) and is discussed in the section 
to follow.  
Despite its detractors, the life-cycle hypothesis of saving has received considerable 
support.  Davies (1981) finds that because death is uncertain, it is not possible for an 
individual to perfectly predict the amount of dissaving that can take place in 
retirement. Attanasio and Browning (1993, p. 22) state “ The evidence presented 
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shows that the life cycle model cannot be easily dismissed. Indeed, we believe that 
the model does a good job of representing consumption behavior over the life cycle”. 
Gomes and Michaeledis (2005) show that a life-cycle model calibrated with realistic 
labour income risk is feasible. Adding to this support, Japelli (2005, p. 173) finds that 
the life-cycle hypothesis “is still the reference framework for analyzing individual and 
aggregate saving” and concludes that “Fifty years after the publication of LCH, no 
single theory can explain the vast body of evidence on saving behavior, and no 
comparable theory has replace the LCH.”(Jappelli, 2005, p. 184). 
The preceding hypotheses – proposed by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954), Friedman 
(1957) and Keynes (1936) - all ignore important elements of human behavior in the 
sense that they assume that human beings will always act rationally.  Therefore it is 
not possible to conclude that either one of these theories is entirely valid1.  For the 
purposes of this paper, it is accepted that the method individuals use to accumulate 
capital is in line with the life-cycle hypothesis on the basis that recent empirical 
evidence has shown retirement fund asset allocation to be consistent with this 
hypothesis (Bikker, Broeders, Hollanders, & Ponds, 2012)although there are inherent 
limitations, which are discussed in the next section.  
Human Behaviour 
Whilst the aforementioned theories of saving are relevant for understanding the 
economics involved in savings choices, they ignore elements of human behaviour.  It 
is therefore necessary to obtain an understanding of the behavioural factors that 
influence how individuals save. This section will discuss issues regarding self-control 
(Thaler & Shefrin, 1981),  poor financial education (Duflo & Saez, 2002) and risk 
aversion (Bodie & Crane, 1997; Bodie, Treussard, et al., 2008), all of which are likely 
to influence savings behaviour in some manner. 
                                                     
1 This is shown in Hall’s (1978) creation of a life cycle- permanent income hypothesis, which takes into 
account parts of either theory. 
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Self-Control 
In the paper titled “Life Cycle, Individual Thrift, and the Wealth of Nations”, Modigliani 
(1986) discusses the idea that saving for retirement requires a degree of rationality 
and self-control. This asserts that households are forward looking and are able to plan 
adequately over both the short term and long term.  Diamond and Hausman (1984) 
contend that sometimes households may be unable to convert income into 
consumption through some liquidity problem, or are not forward looking, but rather 
backward looking and base their future expectations on past experience. This 
behaviour is a result of dealing with significant uncertainty regarding retirement.  
Shefrin and Thaler (1988) argue that households behave too myopically to make 
adequate reserves for retirement.  Individuals often fail to save enough for retirement, 
as this would require that their present standard of living be reduced in order to have 
a better standard of living at a later stage (Fernández-Villaverde & Krueger, 2011). This 
is because instant consumption appears to be a more attractive alternative to 
postponing consumption to retirement. Shefrin and Thaler (1988) propose that very 
few consumers are capable of computing the complex calculations that are implicit in 
life-cycle theory (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988). This echoes the findings of Johnson et al. 
(1987), of people generally being incapable of making coherent and consistent 
consumption choices. The finding is based on an experiment where individuals are 
hypothetically currently 35 years of age and will certainly die on their 75th birthday 
and have fixed earnings until retirement at age 65. These individuals are then asked 
to make consumption choices based on the assumption that they will have no health 
issues, and no future uncertainty, and no dependents to leave any accumulated 
wealth to upon death. Common calculation errors included the undervaluation of 
future earnings and a tendency to over-save resulting in large portions of wealth being 
left behind at a hypothetical date of death. Johnson et al. (1987) recognised the 
limitations of the experiment that reduced the time frame for decision-making and 
prohibited consultation with an expert; nonetheless more than two-thirds of the 
sample were left with substantial wealth at the date of death – with no bequest 
motive possible.  
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To overcome the inability to calculate the amount of saving that is necessary, most 
people use heuristics or rules of thumb (Thaler & Benartzi, 2007). Thaler and Benartzi 
(2007) recognise that self-control is an aspect that is difficult for individuals to deal 
with, and thus these consumers will often resort to using pension plans in order to 
force their own self-control.  Individuals will use a form of mental accounting (Thaler, 
1985) and categorise money into current spendable income, current assets and future 
income (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988).  Individuals have the greatest propensity to consume 
from changes in current income and the lowest propensity to consume from future 
income: in essence an aversion to borrowing against future income.  Shefrin and 
Thaler (1988) contend that whilst basic life-cycle theory suggests retirees should dis-
save all of their assets i.e. there should be no substantial residual assets at the date of 
death; a behavioural resistance to spend from current assets and future income 
inhibits this assumption in reality, resulting in residual assets at death.  
The difficulty with saving for retirement in a discretionary manner is often a result of 
a lack of willpower or self-control.  This can be overcome by joining a pension plan 
where an employer matches the employee contributions, which is often mandated. 
Choi, Libson and Madrian (2011) show that even with an arbitrage opportunity, 
employees are not willing to sign up for these pension plans which are optional. In this 
situation, employees would be able to withdraw employer contributions free of 
charge as they have passed the legislated age for penalties. These employees give up 
on average 1.6% of their annual salary by not taking up the arbitrage opportunity.  This 
results in these employees foregoing increased wealth equivalent to 1.6% of their 
annual salary as a result of not taking up this opportunity; behaviour which is not 
economically rational.  
Thaler (1994) states, “ Most studies are unable to reject the hypothesis that the 
elasticity of personal saving with respect to the interest rate is zero” (p. 186). This 
indicates that a differential return is unlikely to alter the amount that an individual is 
willing to save. When this is coupled with Bodie’s (2003) findings it shows that 
individuals are unlikely to change the amount they save, even if at some decision 
horizons they find that their savings are inadequate.  However, at the same time 
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evidence suggests that once people start putting savings away, they are likely to 
continue to do so (Thaler, 1994) . These findings may explain the above anomaly 
where employees forgo an additional 1.6% of their salary. Alternatively, the lack of 
uptake in retirement savings could also be as a result of the peer effect (Bernartzi & 
Thaler, 2007) where individuals consult with their spouses and friends over retirement 
advice rather than with experts. However, the peer effect is not only responsible for 
poor savings behavior as it may encourage improved saving behavior (Duflo & Saez, 
2002, 2003). These effects could be for a number of reasons, including external factors 
such as the working environment leading to better information amongst one group of 
peers than in others. 
Financial Education 
Duflo and Saez (2002) suggest that low participation could also be as a result of poor 
financial education – which may also explain the poor savings behaviour highlighted 
above. Similarly, Duflo and Saez (2003) found that offering an incentive for financial 
education increased the attendance at a seminar; both for people who were not 
offered the incentive, as well as those who were. This shows that people have a desire 
for financial education, even without the presence of a direct incentive. Having 
attended an informative seminar, participation in retirement plans increased amongst 
attendees. This lends to the idea that individuals do not seek out information 
effectively and are thus unlikely to have given a large amount of time and thought to 
the adequacy of their retirement plans, an indicator of a lack of financial education. 
Bernatzi and Thaler (2007) argue that increased participation in 401(k) accounts is not 
as a result of wilful joining, but rather as a result of mandatory enforcement by 
employers for new employees, resulting in a ‘joining’ bias – inflating the participation 
rates. This further illustrates that one cannot interpret increased participation as an 
indicator of increased willingness to save.  
To add to this discussion; Bodie (2003) raises concerns around the current financial 
products that are available to the public. The reason is there is too much choice, where 
the additional options do not increase the welfare, as they are neither desirable nor 
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understandable. On this premise, Bodie (2003) argues that skilled financial 
intermediaries rather than retail customers should undertake retirement planning and 
investing. This leads to the conclusion that in saving for retirement, investment 
choices must be dynamic and that general citizens need advice. To support the lack of 
understanding, Clark, Lusardi and Mitchell (2015) performed a study in the United 
States which indicated that employees who completed a survey in financial literacy 
are more likely to start saving or less likely to stop saving post-survey.  
Previously, institutional investors have been largely responsible for financial planning 
advice, however, it appears there has been a shift with households beginning to take 
a more active role and more responsibility for their retirement saving (Bodie, 
Treussard, et al., 2008). This could be as a result of the increasing opportunity for 
retirees to engage in part-time employment (Bodie, Treussard, et al., 2008), which can 
augment their utilization of retirement savings. 
A common problem that Bodie and Treussard (2007a) point out is that, on average, 
an individual saving for retirement is not well-educated in the field of finance and thus 
has a poor understanding of asset allocation, which would result in them making poor 
decisions. t  It is also important to note that not all decisions are based on economic 
rationality, as individuals often retire for reasons other than economic or age related 
reasons; these include their health status, a desire to pursue other activities and their 
partner’s work status (Buetler et al., 2005).  
Risk Aversion 
A key behavioral bias found to be present amongst individuals who should save for 
retirement is risk aversion (Benartzi & Thaler 1999; Watson & McNaughton 2007).Risk 
aversion refers to the psychological behaviour where an individual prefers a certain 
outcome to a gamble, even when the gamble has a higher expected value (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1984). This, applied to a retirement saving context, would be investing in a 
low risk low yield asset class at an early stage in their career; when they should rather 
be investing in a higher yielding asset class (Bodie & Crane, 1997).  
11 
 
Retirement saving behavior is driven by risk tolerance; an individual with low job 
security has high human capital risk and thus reduces overall risk by choosing low risk 
financial assets (Bodie, Merton, & Samuelson, 1992). Bodie and Treussard (2007a) 
describe human capital as the ability to earn income by utilising the skillset the 
individual has acquired (Bodie et al., 1992). For example, an individual with a low 
degree of job security (associated with high human capital risk) would achieve more 
satisfaction from investing in a low risk-low yield asset class; this is implicit 
diversification as if the individual were to lose their source of income, it is unlikely that 
their investment value would be significantly changed due to lower volatility 
(associated with low risk asset class).  
Building on risk aversion, it is suggested that as human capital risk increases over the 
course of one’s career, due partly to increased salary and partly to fewer years 
remaining to recover from setbacks, they should shift their asset allocation from high 
yielding equity instruments (‘stocks’) early on in their career, to safer, lower yielding 
instruments as they age (Bodie, Treussard, et al., 2008; Bodie, 2003). This reduces the 
overall volatility of their worth (being the sum of human capital and asset capital).  
This should result in a more certain final value for their retirement savings – as the 
lower yielding instrument is associated with lower volatility. Van Rooij, Lusardi and 
Alessie (2012) suggest that there is a relationship between financial literacy, and the 
decision to invest in equities.  This supports the findings of Guiso and Japelli (2005) 
who argue that lack of awareness results in sub-optimal asset allocation. Guiso, 
Sapienza and Zingales (2008) contend that those who are less financially literate 
distrust the equity market and are therefore less likely to invest in equities, and that 
those who are less financially literate are less likely to diversify their asset holdings 
(Guiso & Jappelli, 2008). This indicates that those who are less financially literate 
might be more inclined to accept an investment in a low risk2 fund as a consequence 
of the human interaction they can have with financial advisors. 
                                                     
2 Regulation 28 compliant funds are accepted to be lower risk funds, as will be explained in the next 
section infra.  
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Collectively, the behavioural influences on retirement savings behavior are significant. 
It is possible to conclude that whilst an economic theory such as the life-cycle 
hypothesis may predict economic behavior of a rational individual, the 
aforementioned behaviors show that individuals do not always act rationally, and are 
not always capable of maximizing their own utility.  
This section and the preceding one provide a general understanding of retirement 
saving. To add context to the discussion, the next sections will discuss pension fund 
regulation and tax legislation in South Africa.  
Pension Fund Regulation in South Africa 
Pension, Provident and Retirement Annuity funds in South Africa are governed by 
legislation, namely the Pensions Funds Act, 24 of 1956 as well as the regulations that 
are applicable to said act.  The definitions of each of these funds can be found in the 
first section of the act.  Each fund has trustees who are charged with ensuring the fund 
operates in an acceptable manner. 
In South Africa, there are three predominant savings vehicles for retirement savings: 
namely Pension Funds, Provident Funds and Retirement Annuity Funds. These funds 
operate with the main objective to accumulate savings during one’s career in order to 
maintain one’s lifestyle after retirement, and all operate in a similar manner.  The 
major differences between these funds previously were the deductibility of 
contributions, coupled with the requirements and limitations on withdrawals. Both 
pension fund and retirement annuity fund contributions were tax deductible under 
s11(k) and s11(n) of the Income Tax Act. The maximum lump sum withdrawal was 
limited to one third of the value saved at retirement; the remainder must be used for 
an annuity. Provident fund contributions were not tax deductible, but upon 
retirement the entire value of the savings may be withdrawn as a lump sum.   
However, this has changed with the promulgation of the Taxation Laws Amendment 
Act, 31 of 2013, which becomes effective 1 March 2015. This amendment permits all 
contributions to pension, provident and retirement annuity funds to be tax 
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deductible, and will impose capital withdrawal limits on all three funds. This is 
explained later in the chapter.   
Of particular relevance to this research is the amendment to Regulation 28 of the 
regulations made under section 36 of the Pensions Fund Act 24 of 1956.  Regulation 
28 imposes limits on the investments of retirement funds; the purpose of these limits 
is to protect the funds from making imprudent investments (National Treasury, 2010). 
The limits prescribe the maximum percentage of the fund assets that can be invested 
in any particular asset class, as well as per issuer or entity within that asset class.  The 
effect is that these limits enforce diversification, and as a result are supposed to 
protect investors from poor investment decision and asset allocation. The need for 
these limits arose as the investment opportunities available to funds became 
significantly more complex and the presence of foreign investments had increased 
(Financial Services Board, 2010). This presented a problem, as the regulation did not 
have measures in place that provided for these investment opportunities, resulting in 
a grey area that could be subject to exploitation by the funds. The consequence of 
such exploitation could undermine the intent of the legislation - protecting the 
members of the funds.  
In South Africa, contributors to Pension funds are known as members, as the funds 
are set up as non-profit. This means that the underlying earnings of the fund can only 
be used to settle reasonable fund expenses, and the remainder is distributed amongst 
the members.   These members belong to predominantly defined benefit contribution 
funds (Financial Services Board, 2010). The global shift from defined benefit 
retirement funds to defined contribution funds (Broadbent, Palumbo, & Woodman, 
2006; Gallery, Newton, & Palm, 2011; Zelinsky, 2004) has shifted the risk of poor 
investment to the member. A defined benefit fund would have promised members a 
benefit based on lifetime earnings. The liabilities of this type of fund are therefore 
subject to inflation risk. The fund had an obligation to pay the member in terms of the 
contract, which was based on a formula linked to lifetime earnings. If the fund’s assets 
did not appreciate enough, this would not result in the member receiving a reduced 
pension, as the benefit was previously defined (Besley & Prat, 2003; Broadbent et al., 
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2006). In order to beat this risk, the funds needed to take risk in order to earn a risk 
premium (Hoevenaars, Molenaar, Schotman, & Steenkamp, 2008). The defined 
contribution fund makes no such guarantee, as the fund’s liabilities are based on the 
contributions into it. All defined contribution funds are conduits for investment risk 
(Bodie, Ruffino, & Treussard, 2008); a member contributes to the fund which then 
invests on their behalf; however there is no guarantee of a return of any sort. Bodie 
(2003) argue that the way investing for retirement has been undertaken in the past is 
likely to change. Generally, there has been a shift from the use of defined benefit 
funds toward the use of defined contribution funds. Bodie (2003) argues further that 
the way an individual plans their retirement is usually based on their expected age of 
retirement less their current age (‘planning horizon’) and that this can be subdivided 
into several smaller time periods where the individual can review and change their 
asset allocation (‘decision horizon’) and that both of these periods differ from person 
to person.  
In addition to the tax benefit each member receives, which is explained later in this 
Chapter, Regulation 28 funds receive a further tax benefit, and as a result, so do its 
members upon withdrawal of their funds (R. H. Van Rensburg, 2014). The funds are 
provided with exemptions on dividends received, which are not subjected to 
withholdings tax; (an ordinary person would pay withholdings tax of 15% on dividend 
income).  All receipts and accruals to the fund are exempt under s10(1)(d) of the South 
African Income Tax act, which results in the fund not being taxed on interest earned. 
Further, the fund is exempt from capital gains tax, thus is not taxed on any gains in the 
value of its underlying investments (R. H. Van Rensburg, 2014). These benefits taken 
together give the fund a substantial advantage over the ordinary citizen in terms of a 
reduced (non-existent) tax liability.  
Regulation 28 and amendments thereto 
Regulation 28 prescribed certain maxima per investment type based on the fair value 
of assets under management.  These maxima (before amendment) are shown in the 
table below. 
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The maxima are broadly: 
 No more than 75% may be invested in equities 
 No more than 25% may be invested in property 
 No more than 90% may be invested in a combination of equities and 
property 
 No more than 5% may be invested in the sponsoring employer 
 No more than 15% may be invested in a large capitalization listed equity, 
and 10% in any single other equity 
 No more than 20% may be invested with any single bank 
 No more than 15% may be invested off-shore (recent exchange control limit 
changes upwards have been provided for to portfolios upon their 
application to the Retirement fund Registrar i.e. the imposed limit is actually 
20%) 
 No more than 2.5% may be invested in other assets 
There are no restrictions on investments into money-market or RSA government 
issued fixed-income instruments. 
Derivative instruments are not defined, leaving them to fall within the category of 
“other assets”. No guidance is given as to how derivatives may be employed. 
Source: South African Government Gazette (National Treasury, 2010) 
The amendments to Regulation 28 (National Treasury, 2011) updated the fiduciary 
responsibility of the fund. A number of terms are re-defined, and a number of new 
definitions were introduced, including one for derivative instruments. The changes to 
Regulation 28 have resulted in a stricter implicit investment mandate for the trustees 
of pension funds.  New limits have been imposed in order to reduce the investment 
risk that members are exposed to and provide guidance to trustees on how to fulfil 
their fiduciary duty.  
Funds are now required to have an investment policy that is reviewed annually and 
new limits are imposed on investment types and opportunities (s3(a), s3(d) of the 
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Regulations). These limits are summarised in Appendix A. More importantly, the 
amendment introduces a look-through principle (s4(a)) which is tasked with 
preventing funds from using structured assets to circumvent limits, and will require 
that the fund accounts for the underlying assets of any such asset. The last major 
change to the regulations was the introduction of a prohibition on borrowing other 
than for bridging purposes; in order to meet liquidity requirements (s5(a), s5(b)) 
(National Treasury, 2011). 
The maxima, after the amendment to Regulation 28 are as follows: 
The new maxima: 
 No more than 10% of total assets may be invested in hedge funds 
 No more than 10% of total assets may be invested in private equity funds 
 No more than 10% may be invested in unlisted companies 
 No more than 10% may be invested in any single listed company with a 
market capitalization of between R2bn and R20bn 
 No more than 30% of South African Liabilities plus 100% of foreign liabilities 
may be invested in foreign equity 
 Source:  South African Government Gazette (National Treasury, 2011) 
A detailed comparison between the new and old Regulation 28 is provided in 
Appendix B. 
The rationale behind the change to the regulations was a result of the investment 
landscape changing significantly, which resulted in more complex investment 
opportunities in addition to a variety of structured products. Furthermore, some of 
the products that had become available, were not defined in the original Regulation 
28 and therefore there was uncertainty as to investment limits (Financial Services 
Board, 2010). 
The regulations provided little guidance on how the trustees of pension funds should 
adopt an investment strategy for the fund. This meant that an inappropriate strategy 
could be utilised, provided it remained within the statutory limits (Financial Services 
Board, 2010).  For example, the provisions of the act allowed up to 100% investment 
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in fixed income instruments resulting in maturity mismatches. Furthermore the 
regulations did not define derivative instruments. As a consequence, the original 
regulation was not meeting the objective of protecting retirement fund members 
from poor investment decisions which could result in the fund not meeting the 
objectives of retirement saving. Studies have shown that statutory regulation does not 
necessarily have a positive impact on the performance of retirement funds (Bohl, 
Lischewski, & Voronkova, 2011; Senderski, 2014). Further to this argument, Lee (2011) 
suggests that there is little evidence to indicate that a risk-based approach to portfolio 
construction will outperform a mean-variance portfolio.   
Tax implications of investing in Regulation 28 funds 
The Income Tax Act, 58 of 1962 provides tax benefits as it legislates that taxpayers 
may deduct any contributions to pension funds (s11(k)) and to retirement annuity 
funds (s11(n)),  subject to certain limits, from their income in the determination of 
taxable income, resulting in a lower tax liability.  These funds are the same funds that 
are subject to the Pension Funds Act.  The benefits are summarised below (all 
references to the Income Tax Act, 58 of 1962): 
 Contributions to pension funds are limited to the greater of R1750 or 7.5% of 
retirement -funding employment as defined– s11(k) 
 Contributions to retirement annuity funds are limited to 15% of income 
excluding retirement-funding employment  – s11(n) 
 Withdrawals from these funds are taxed in terms of the Second Schedule of 
the Income Tax act. The result is a lower effective tax rate than if the funds 
were to constitute normal income. 
These benefits are meant to provide an incentive to save for retirement; but the 
incentive is only provided if saving takes place in a fund that is subject to the 
constraints imposed by Regulation 28 (‘Regulation 28 compliant’). Despite these 
benefits, if investments in these funds are accessed before the date of retirement in 
terms of the fund rules (often 55, 60 or 65 years of age) the contributor is taxed 
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heavily3, up to a maximum marginal rate of 36% - only 5% less than the maximum 
marginal tax rate of 41%.  These penalty provisions support the findings of Beshers et 
al. (2015) who suggest that individuals have strong present-bias, and that illiquid 
commitment accounts are more likely to result in greater savings. 
The Taxation Laws Amendment Act, 31 of 2013 simplifies the above by replacing the 
above limits under s11(k) and s11(n) with 27.5%, effective as of 01 March 2016. The 
amendment also imposes a contribution limit of R350 000 per annum (National 
Treasury, 2015). 
The manner in which these incentives work is to moderately increase the size of the 
initial investment as a result of the tax relief (Attanasio, Banks, & Wakefield, 2004)4. 
In the next section, the importance of asset allocation will be discussed, with a specific 
view to investment for retirement purposes. 
Asset Allocation, Volatility and Offshore Exposure 
The above section explains Regulation 28, and its limitations. This section will address 
the two major weaknesses of Regulation 28; being asset allocation and offshore 
exposure.  Research suggests that as much as 90% of return variability can be 
explained by asset allocation (Brinson, Hood, & Beebower, 1995; Hariharan, 2000; 
Ibbotson & Kaplan, 2000). It is therefore paramount that investors spend time 
considering the asset allocation of their portfolios. Generally, investors are advised to 
reduce their exposure to risky assets as they age. This is in agreement with the 
arguments provided by Bodie and Treussard (2008). In this section, the ‘optimal’ 
manner to allocate assets will be discussed. This discussion will follow the line of asset 
allocation relative to risk, thereafter considering volatility of the underlying 
instruments. The discussion will then be furthered with the consideration of offshore 
diversification. This will then be contrasted to the way Regulation 28 compliant funds 
allocate assets.  
                                                     
3 The major penalty is that an early withdrawal incurs tax for any amounts over R22500, whereas with 
normal retirement taxation only begins at amounts over R315000. 
4 An Illustrative example will be provided in the appendices. 
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In saving for retirement, the optimal asset allocation is person specific, as it needs to 
consider labour income levels, and the risk of change to labour income (human capital 
risk). Labour income is the income individuals are able to earn by employing their 
human capital.  The presence of labour income allows an individual to have an age-
varying investment strategy (Cocco, Gomes, & Maenhout, 2005). This means that the 
investment can be changed over the course of one’s life, to allocate assets to suit one’s 
risk profile at a given point in time. Cocco et al (2005) postulate the idea that labour 
income is an asset, as it can be capitalised and insured against risk. This makes it a 
substitute for a risk free asset, as labour income is not correlated with equity returns. 
If the equity market experiences negative returns, it does not correlate to immediate 
changes in labour income. At the start of the individual’s career, his human capital risk 
is lower than near the end, as he has more time to recover from a setback. Over the 
duration of their career, individuals utilise this human capital to earn labour income, 
and their human capital risk increases as they move toward the end of their career.   
As one participates in the work force, one’s total human capital diminishes with one’s 
remaining work life, and it is necessary for the individual to purchase more risk free 
assets such that their total capital risk profile remains constant. This strategy can be 
summarised into a high proportion of equity savings at the start of a career, which is 
slowly reduced, by selling equities to purchase less risky assets over the course of the 
individual’s career. This investment strategy is supported by numerous studies (Cocco 
et al., 2005; Horneff, Maurer, & Stamos, 2008). It is also important to note that 
individuals with increased labour risk would benefit more from optimal asset 
allocation, as optimal asset allocation would reduce their investment risk and lower 
their total capital risk profile.  
Upon investment in a Regulation 28 fund, individuals cede the responsibility of their 
own asset allocation in retirement savings to that of a fund manager, within the 
Regulation 28 mandated limits. Notwithstanding this cession, it would be naïve to hold 
the view that the individual is unaware of these limits; specifically the limitation placed 
on equity. Wepener (2014) finds that the limits of Regulation 28 do not encourage 
optimal asset allocation in a portfolio.  
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A question that must be borne in mind is, in the long-term, are equity instruments and 
the stock market really as risky as finance theory would have us believe (Ibbotson & 
Chen, 2003; Pastor & Stambaugh, 2012; Siegel, 1998)? This question is central to asset 
allocation within pension funds (Brinson, Hood, & Beebower, 1986, 1991; Sharpe, 
1992). Below, we will examine whether equity instruments reflect increased risk when 
a longer investment horizon, such as that of a pension investment programme. 
It is widely accepted that in the short-term, equity instruments need to offer some 
sort of risk premium when compared to fixed income instruments (Mehra & Prescott, 
1985). It is on this premise that the models such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(Fama & French, 2004; Sharpe, 1964) and Arbitrage Pricing Theory (Ross, 1976) are 
built.  
Connolly et al. (2005) showed that in the long term, bonds and equity returns exhibit 
a modest positive correlation over the long term. It was noted that bond returns tend 
to be higher relative to equity in periods of increased market uncertainty. This is due 
to the preferential treatment bondholders would receive if a company were to go 
bankrupt (Connolly et al., 2005).  These findings support the initial views of Fama and 
French (1989) who found strong positive correlation between equity and bond 
returns, but noted that the equity premium would be reduced in times of economic 
uncertainty.  
Equity has been shown to be more volatile than debt instruments (Mehra, 2003), with 
equity instruments exhibiting a 20% standard deviation, in contrast to debt 
instruments with a 4% standard deviation. However, over a period of 110 years (1889 
– 2000), equity returned a premium of 6.9% over fixed income (debt) instruments 
(Mehra, 2003). Upon consideration of the holding period of a Regulation 28 fund, 
where members join at the beginning of their working career and withdraw upon 
retirement, Mehra's (2003) findings imply a case for greater equity exposure.  
Bodie (1995) argues that the view to have higher equity exposure as a younger 
investor is fallacious. The argument is promulgated on the premise that most 
measures of equity volatility ignore the magnitude of the potential shortfall, so whilst 
equity might only have a 4% chance of not reaching a desired value over a 25-year 
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horizon, this chance does not account for the difference between actual values and 
expected values.  Whilst this is a valid argument, Bodie (1995) does not account for 
any excess return over and above the expected value.  This is substantiated by the 
findings of Barberis (2000), who contributes evidence that, when estimation 
uncertainty is included, there is still sufficient evidence to allocate more of a portfolio 
to equities when the investment horizon is lengthened. 
Lettau and Wachter (2007) showed that value equities, (equities defined as paying a 
dividend) are not as risky as perceived due to having lower duration, whereas growth 
equities (those without a dividend) have a higher duration. Duration in this context 
refers to the price sensitivity of the equity instrument relative to changes in the 
company’s future growth prospects5, and acts as a measure of risk of variability in 
returns. Essentially, the dividends paid on these equities reduce the proportion of cash 
flows that occur later in the asset holding lifetime. This is a factor that would 
contribute to equity (particularly value equities) being less risky over a longer holding 
period. The duration-based argument further enhances the argument for the inclusion 
of greater proportions of equity, as dividend-paying equities can be used to reduce 
the volatility of the portfolio as a whole. 
Similarly, Wachter (2010) finds that as the length of the investment horizon increases, 
so should the allocation to equities, yet Regulation 28 retirement funds – which 
operate, as long-term investment vehicles for their members - are restricted from 
maintaining equity exposure of more than 75%. Wachter’s (2010) finding is supported 
by the findings of Blanchett, Finke and Pfau (2013) – who find that long-term investors 
should hold proportionately more equity than short-term investors. Furthermore, 
there are restrictions placed on foreign investments, which are discussed under the 
next sub-heading.  
                                                     
5 For example, consider equity A and equity B, both costing R100. Equity B pays a regular dividend of 
R10, whereas equity A pays none. If both companies have a reduction of 1% in their growth prospects, 
we would expect equity A’s price to decrease by relatively more than equity B. This illustrates equity 
A’s higher duration. 
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Offshore Exposure 
French and Poterba (1991) make the case that whilst the benefits of international 
diversification are widely accepted, most investors hold most of their wealth in 
domestic assets, a phenomenon known as home bias. Tesar and Werner (1995) find 
strong evidence to support home bias, and note that differential international 
transaction costs are unlikely to explain home bias. 
There is evidence to suggest that local investors in emerging markets benefit more 
from international diversification (Chiou, 2009). This is likely due to the lack of 
diversification available in an emerging market. For example, consider that the JSE is 
heavily exposed to movements in the resources sector (P. Van Rensburg, 2002), so 
much so that the use of the Resources Index can effectively form part of a two factor 
arbitrage pricing model. Eun et al. (2008) show that international diversification 
provides economically significant benefits to investors, and makes a case that 
diversification can be achieved with both large-cap and small-cap foreign equities.  
This is supported by Chiou et al. (2009) who show significant benefits from 
international diversification.  
Despite the proven benefits of diversification, both historically and more recently, 
Regulation 28 still imposes limits on fund exposure to foreign investments. The next 
section will discuss whether the incentives offered are actually effective, given the 
shortfalls identified above with regard to asset allocation and lack of foreign 
diversification. 
The Effectiveness of Incentives  
Generally, economists will tell you that incentives are relevant (Gneezy, Meier, & Rey-
Biel, 2011a), or perhaps that “Monetary incentives are powerful tools for motivating 
people”(Kamenica, 2012, p. 427). However, to matter they must function to achieve 
the outcome they intend to (Gneezy, Meier, & Rey-Biel, 2011b). Whilst the value of 
incentives are shown in the above information, a common question in academia has 
been regarding the effectiveness of these incentives in inducing individuals to save 
(Börsch-Supan, 2004; Costrell & McGee, 2010; Disney et al., 2008; Holt & Laury, 2002; 
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Thaler, Sunstein, & Balz, 2010).  The functioning of these incentives should either 
increase participation in such plans or increase the amount saved in such plans; as 
both of these functions would result in increased saving. This section will examine the 
literature that discusses whether incentives are indeed effective. 
In the United States, an individual retirement account (‘IRA’) operates in much the 
same manner as a pension fund would in South Africa, in the sense that an individual 
is permitted to deduct the contributions to an IRA from their taxable income (subject 
to certain limits), which has the effect of reducing the tax liability, thereby increasing 
disposable income or the amount that can be invested in the fund. The money saved 
in an IRA can grow tax-free and is only taxed upon withdrawal, as is the case with 
Regulation 28 funds. These accounts defer taxes until retirement, yet despite 
approximately 50% of the United States workforce being eligible for them, only 1% of 
the workforce actually participate in them (Hubbard & Skinner, 1996) due to the fact 
that contributing to them is voluntary. This is evidence that the presence of the 
incentive has not necessarily increased participation. 
Venti and Wise (1991) find that IRA’s are effective in encouraging new saving. This 
finding was contested by Gale and Scholz (1994) on the basis that empirical estimates 
indicated that IRA’s contributed to very little new saving, but instead resulted in a shift 
of taxable forms of savings into IRA’s. Poterba, Venti and Wise (1996) responded to 
these findings, noting that different forms of analyses can yield different results even 
when the same data is used; however it was stressed that their analyses and findings 
present strong evidence that IRA’s are effective in encouraging new net saving 
(Poterba et al., 1996). Gale and Scholz (1996) contend the Poterba-Venti-Wise (1996) 
claim that incentives increase saving on the basis that the increase in private saving is 
offset by the reduction in public saving through reduced tax revenue. Engen, Gale and 
Scholz (1996) also introduced the concept that there is an inherent bias in the Venti-
Wise framework (Venti & Wise, 1991) in that people who are going to save, will save 
regardless of whether an IRA exists or not, and that this is not controlled. Another 
problem with the Venti-Wise (1991) argument was that the IRA balances were pre-
tax, and would still need to be taxed upon withdrawal which resulted in an 
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overstatement of these assets relative to non-IRA assets. Engen, Gale and Scholz 
(1996) conclude that the presence of investment opportunities outside of IRA’s with 
lower effective tax rates reduce the effectiveness of savings plans; stating that 
incentives may be poorly structured in this regard, as was first proposed by Bernheim 
and Scholz (1993). 
The argument of public saving and private saving is re-visited by Axel Börsch-Supan 
(2004) using European data. Börsch-Supan (2004) states that the presence of public 
pension replacement rates reduces private saving. This is a direct result of individuals 
being aware that a percentage of their pre-retirement income will be replaced by a 
public pension. Whilst the incentives strengthen the attractiveness of pension plans, 
there is little evidence to add to “the core question, whether tax relief creates new 
additional savings” (Börsch-Supan, 2004, p. 31).  Börsch-Supan (2004) finds that tax 
relief is most effective in the upper two-thirds of the income distribution, a 
consequence of having increased disposable income and the ability to forego 
consumption in light of saving and reducing the tax liability. Even so, it is not all too 
effective due to societies inherent misunderstanding of the power of compound 
interest. Börsch-Supan (2004) concludes that boosting saving needs more than just 
tax relief but emphasises that there may be non-economic reasons that these plans 
and incentives are effective, such as overcoming behavioural biases against saving. In 
the South African context, Ting and  Kollamparambil (2015) find that the presence and 
possibility of gorvernment grants in retirement disincentivise saving in the early 
working years.  
Attanasio and Banks (2004) contribute to the Venti-Wise (1991) and Gale-Scholz 
(1994) debate with the view that effectiveness cannot be measured by the size and 
uptake of these savings plans, but must be measured by the increase in saving over 
what would have been saved without them. Attanasio and Banks (2004) use data from 
both the United States and the United Kingdom. Two tests are used to determine 
whether these saving plans and incentives increase saving, relative to if no plan had 
existed. This is done by contrasting regression results between data prior to the 
introduction of such plans to data from after the introduction; both tests returned 
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results that consumers are not reducing consumption (the alternative to saving) and 
thus the plans encourage very little new saving. However, Attanasio and Banks (2004) 
are quick to point out that the effectiveness of incentives does not only depend on 
economic outcomes, but that these incentives can address other behavioural issues 
as highlighted throughout this review.  
The effectiveness of the tax incentives in the United States was further challenged on 
the premise that there is no marginal incentive to save beyond the tax-deductible limit 
(Gravelle, 1991). The annual limit for contributions in 2015 was $5500 for citizens 
under 50 and $6500 otherwise (Internal Revenue Service, 2015). Hubbard and Skinner 
(1996) refute this in the sense that the limit should not be viewed as a short-term 
annual limit, but rather as a lifetime limit. Gale and Scholz (1994) support this view by 
showing that only thirty percent of contributors to IRA’s contribute to the limit for 
each of three years, insinuating that the remainder would face an incentive in one or 
more years. 
Poterba et al. (1996) argue that there is no noticeable reduction in the levels of other 
assets of contributors to IRA’s and 401(k) accounts, a view that is supported by 
Hubbard (1984). This leads Hubbard (1984) and Poterba et al. (1996) to conclude that 
it is unlikely that retirement plan assets are funded through a reduction in other 
saving; and that incentive plans do work to increase saving. The premise of this 
conclusion is that the contributors are not reducing saving elsewhere, therefore they 
must be reducing consumption to save in the IRA, and therefore this is new saving. 
This argument (Poterba et al., 1996) is enhanced when the assumptions and sample 
size of the Gale and Scholz (1994) study are challenged. Recently, the effectiveness of 
tax incentives have been challenged on the basis that they are expensive to the state, 
inefficient and inequitable as those who receive the greatest benefit are those who 
are least in need thereof (Marr, Frentz, & Huang, 2013).  
Savings plans with incentives are shown to be useful in the sense that they encourage 
information spreading and economic literacy as well as offering a method for 
individuals to overcome the irrational behaviour of deferring saving in preference of 
current consumption (Attanasio et al., 2004). However, there are several decades of 
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academic research showing findings that individuals are not rational, are not perfectly 
self-interested and may make choices or hold preferences that are not entirely 
consistent (Congdon & Kling, 2009). Whilst the presence of these savings plans is 
consistent with public policy, there is substantial evidence that they are not working 
effectively.  
Conclusion 
The literature reviewed has shown that there is no one single model of consumption 
and savings that is entirely valid. Despite minor drawbacks, the life-cycle hypothesis 
(Modigliani & Brumberg, 1954) was found to best explain savings behaviour.  Despite 
these findings, literature acknowledges that human beings do not always behave as 
economic models predict, due to inherent behavioural biases, which result in 
irrational behaviour. 
Thereafter, an analysis of Regulation 28 showed strong arguments to invest in 
Regulation 28 retirement funds, as these funds provide relatively simple investment 
vehicles for their members to save for retirement.  The members do not have to make 
any investment decisions regarding the underlying investments and the 
administration for tax purposes is performed for the members. There are tax benefits, 
which have the effect of increasing the rate of return as well as the simplicity of 
drawing down on the savings in the form of an annuity when retirement age is 
reached. However, it has been shown that regulation does not necessarily result in 
increased returns, and that the active management required can be detrimental to 
the investors involved (Basu & Andrews, 2014)6. 
The alternative to investing in Regulation 28 funds is for an individual to make their 
own investment choices, discretionary investment, where the individual can choose 
their own asset allocation, and invest directly in the underlying instruments that a 
Regulation 28 fund would. This would result in a loss of the tax benefit, but would also 
                                                     
6 Note: This study focuses on Australian superannuation funds, which permit members to make pre-
tax contributions at lower effective tax rates and any returns within these funds are taxed at lower 
rates. In this manner they function similarly to Regulation 28 compliant funds. 
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not limit the underlying investments that an individual could select. The potential 
advantage of discretionary investments include higher returns, easily accessible 
capital and lower tax rates upon disposal7. 
In light of the aforementioned tax benefits, the effectiveness of incentives was 
considered. The relevant literature demonstrated that the presence of such incentives 
does not encourage as significant change in behaviour as would be expected. The 
literature further showed that the asset allocation restrictions imposed on Regulation 
28 funds might result in sub-optimal investments, which may result in members 
receiving significantly lower returns than if they were to invest in a discretionary 
manner.   
 
  
                                                     
7 Certain discretionary investments are deemed to be capital in nature in terms of s9C of the Income 
Tax Act, subject to a holding period of 3 years. Consequently, upon disposal any gains in value are 
taxed at a maximum effective rate of 13.653%. 
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3. Method 
Research Questions 
As may be seen, the preceding review of the literature has highlighted a contrast 
between the optimal manner in which individuals should save for retirement, as well 
as the statutory limits imposed on, and the structure of, Regulation 28 limits imposed 
on retirement funds in South Africa.  
As a result, the research questions for this study are as follows:  
1. What is the differential nominal return that is required from discretionary, 
non-Regulation 28 compliant investments over a career8 in order to account 
for the tax incentives received by Regulation 28 compliant funds? 
2. Is this return feasible given the historical performance of the South African 
stock market9?  
3. Is Regulation 28 an appropriate tool for managing investment risk, considering 
the correlation of Regulation 28 compliant fund returns with the JSE and the 
variability of returns as measured by standard deviation?   
Research Method  
These research questions are novel. The research will be undertaken by constructing 
a quantitative model (‘the model’) which contrasts the results of discretionary 
investment into an index tracking investment fund and investment in Regulation 28 
compliant funds. For the purposes of this study, it is assumed that employers do not 
give employees the option to contribute to pension funds or provident funds. Rather, 
for the purposes of this study, the Regulation 28 fund is assumed to be a retirement 
                                                     
8 For the purposes of this study, a career has been defined as the period from the first day of 
employment at age 25 to the last day of employment, at age 65. During this period, the individual is 
remunerated for providing services to a company.  
9 This question will be answered using the performance of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (‘JSE’) as 
noted in the assumptions section below.   
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annuity fund. This assumption results in a comparison between discretionary 
investment through a regulated product and true discretionary investment. 
In this study a model is created with two hypothetical individuals. These individuals 
are identical in terms of earnings capability, health, career length and life expectancy. 
The first individual will save for retirement in a Regulation 28 compliant retirement 
annuity fund and will be termed the regulatory investor. The second individual will 
save in a discretionary manner, in assets that do not comply with Regulation 28 and 
will therefore forego the tax deduction of contributions to retirement savings. The 
second individual will be termed the discretionary investor. Both individuals saving 
behaviour will follow that of the life-cycle hypothesis whereby they accumulate capital 
over their working career and then dis-save from retirement until death. 
The effect of the South African Tax legislation is that there is an incentive to save in a 
Regulation 28 compliant fund. The manner in which these incentives work is to 
moderately increase the size of the initial investment as a result of the tax relief they 
afford the individual (Attanasio et al., 2004). For an illustrative example refer to 
Appendix C. 
The model functions based on the input assumptions below. The regulatory investor 
contributes the maximum permissible 27.5% of their income to a Regulation 28 
compliant fund, each year from their first working year, until the year of retirement. 
During each of these years, the investor earns a nominal return, on the balance of 
their retirement savings equal to that of their selected investment vehicle. 
The model incorporates the tax liability of each hypothetical individual and is 
constructed in a manner such that the size of the contributions which are made by the 
discretionary investor are calculated, and will be less than those of the regulatory 
investor (i.e. the discretionary investor’s contributions are “after tax”), so that both 
individuals have the same disposable income after settling their tax liabilities and 
contributing to their respective investments. The purpose of this is to ensure 
comparability of the standard of living of the two hypothetical individuals. An example 
is included in Appendix C, Example 2. 
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Upon retirement, both investors know with certainty that they will live a further 20 
years, and therefore will draw down the maximum annuity possible that will ensure 
that their retirement savings last until death. 
For the purposes of research question 3, a test of correlation of monthly returns to 
the JSE J203 will be undertaken. The annual standard deviation of the fund returns will 
be calculated and contrasted with that of the J203. 
Assumptions 
Given the nature of the model, it is necessary for a variety of input assumptions to be 
made.  These assumptions may be subject to challenges that are highlighted as areas 
for further research in the limitations section below. 
Career and Life Expectancy 
The individual will have a working (and saving) career of 40 years, and will live a further 
20 years after retirement. The retirement age has been set at 65 years of age, this 
being the general retirement age in terms of South African generally accepted labour 
practice for formal employment.  
Earnings Capacity and Taxation 
In the initial base case, the individual does not experience any real salary growth and 
begins his/her working career in the lowest tax bracket. This initial case is then 
modified several times by placing the individual at the beginning of his/her career in 
each of the current distinct tax brackets.  This results in seven base cases. The tax 
brackets and annual rebates are assumed to grow with inflation such that the study 
eliminates the effect of “bracket creep” or fiscal drag10. Based on the data provided in 
Appendix D, it is apparent that the South African Revenue Service (“SARS”) does not 
                                                     
10 “The process whereby an income tax structure with marginal rate progression 
generates revenue growth faster than income growth, due to individuals crossing 
into higher marginal rate tax brackets if thresholds are adjusted at less than the rate 
of increase of nominal incomes” (Creedy & Gemmell, 2014, p. 184) 
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have a consistent basis for the changes to tax brackets and annual rebates, hence a 
modicum of uncertainty exists within this particular variable, which would need to be 
addressed with further research as detailed infra in the discussion section.  
The Taxation Laws Amendment Act, 31 of 2013 imposes a deduction cap of R350 000 
on contributions. Any contributions above this R350 000 will not result in a tax 
deduction. This implies that the salary cap for contributing 27.5% of one’s salary is 
R1272 727 in 2016. For the purposes of this study, it is assumed that the salary cap, 
and consequently, the deduction cap will also grow at the inflation rate. The 
comments above in regard to bracket creep are also apposite with this variable.  
Contributions and savings behaviour 
The regulatory investor will contribute the maximum deductible amount, being 27.5% 
of the retirement funding income, subject to the annual limit of R350 000. These limits 
are imposed as of 01 March 2016 in terms of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act, 31 
of 2013. The discretionary investor will contribute the amount that will result in his 
after-tax, post-contribution disposable income being equal to that of the regulatory 
investor. 
Inflation, Investment timing and returns 
Inflation is assumed to be 6% per annum, the upper bound of the South African 
Reserve Banks inflationary target band (South African Reserve Bank, 2015). 
The critical assumption is that investments will earn a consistent nominal annual 
return equal to the historic return on the selected investment vehicle, that being a 
Regulation 28 compliant fund for the regulatory investor and a JSE index tracking fund 
for the discretionary investor. Refer to appendix E for an illustrative example.  
The discretionary investor is assumed to incur additional tax on 10% of his annual 
investment return11; as a portion of this is likely to be in the form of dividends, which 
                                                     
11 Assume the investor has a savings balance of R100 000 and his marginal tax rate is 38%. Assume 
further his selected investment vehicle earns 15% in the current year. His pre-tax return would be 
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are subject to withholdings tax, thereby modifying his overall tax liability. Dividends 
withholding tax is levied at 15% on South African resident tax payers in terms of s64 
of the Income Tax Act. Historically, the dividend yield on the JSE All Share index has 
been between 2.5% -3% (Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 2015). This equates to tax of 
approximately 0.045%12. Therefore, the 10% used is overly prudent and prejudices the 
discretionary investor, as it has the effect of overstating his tax liability and thus 
understating possible real investment returns. The additional tax is calculated using 
10% of the annual investment return, multiplied by his applicable marginal tax rate. 
Post-retirement, both investors will earn inflationary returns on their remaining 
investment such that additional wealth is not created in the years of retirement. As 
these savings are growing at inflation, there will not be any effect on tax, as the tax 
brackets have been assumed to move at inflationary rates too, consequently, no real 
wealth is created nor no additional taxes paid in real terms. Succinctly put, both 
investors real wealth measured as their entire retirement savings remains constant 
and is only diminished by their withdrawals (“drawdowns”) over their remaining 
lifespan.  
Retirement behaviour 
Upon retirement, neither investor will withdraw one third of their investment. The 
new legislation in the Taxation Laws Amendment Act, 31 of 2013 legislates that should 
an individual have more than R150 000 saved in a fund regulated by Regulation 28, 
two thirds of these savings must be used to purchase an annuity, or be paid out as an 
annuity. Therefore, the amount remaining in the respective savings vehicle will be 
drawn down as an annuity over 20 years. This assumption is simplifying, in order to 
remove the complexity and variability of the amount that could be withdrawn. The 
individual is assumed to have no bequest motive and to know that they will live, with 
                                                     
R15 000. Using the above restriction, 10% (R1 500) of the R15 000 would subject to tax at 38%. The 
result is that tax of R570 would be paid, and only R14 430 would be accumulated to the savings 
balance 
12  A tax rate of 15% multiplied by the dividend yield of 3% results in an effective tax of 0.0045% on 
the total return in a given year.  
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certainty, for exactly 20 years post-retirement. This is an assumption requiring further 
research to substantiate, with particular reference to actuarial calculations and the 
myriad of variables that are taken into account in calculating an actuarially valid age 
of death/life-expectancy. 
Data 
The nominal returns for Regulation 28 investments are based on the best performing 
of 14 compliant funds13. The funds were selected from the two lists of the Top 10 
Regulation 28 funds over both a 5 year period to 31 January 2015, and 10 year period 
to 31 December 2013.  The ranking of these funds was performed by Morningstar and 
Profile Data.    
The data for fund returns used in the model reflects a nominal return from October 
1995 to October 2015, if available. Where the data available represented a shorter 
time period, the data for that period was used. 
The returns for discretionary investment are based upon indices of the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (‘JSE’), over the same period ending in October 2015. The primary 
results will be based on the JSE All Share index (JSE: ALSI), The results will also include 
a comparison to the JSE Shareholder Weighted All Share index (‘J403’) which controls 
for the lack of free-float14 amongst some instruments and the JSE Capped All Share 
index (‘J303’).The J303 limits the percentage per instrument to 10%15.  The use of the 
JSE all-share index is a simplified approach; as indicated in the literature review 
section, asset allocation is an important variable. In reality, the investment universe 
available to the discretionary investor is far greater than a pure equity fund, however 
in the interest of simplicity a pure equity fund was used. 
                                                     
13 These funds were selected from a two lists, comprising 10 funds over a 5 year period and 10 year 
period; however, not all funds on the shorter time period were present on the longer time period, as 
some had limited returns history of less than 10 years.   
14 Free-float methodology refers to the process of taking into account how many shares are available 
on the exchange. This accounts for tightly held shares which do not, and likely will not, trade on the 
exchange due to strategic ownership.  
15 The All Share Capped Index limits the holding of any given stock to 10% by value, such that the full 
index must always comprise of a minimum of ten different stocks.  
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Ethics  
None of the information obtained is confidential and is readily available from the 
sources as cited. No ethical clearances were requires as this study has no interest in 
gender, nor racial differences and no human participants were used in undertaking 
this research.  
Limitations 
This study does not take into account the transaction costs that would be involved in 
investing.  Both Regulation 28 funds and discretionary investors would incur these on 
different scales, it is assumed that the difference in the fees charged to the 
discretionary and regulatory investors would be minimal. This assumption is 
simplifying and is noted as an area for further research.  
Further, the length of the working career, and life expectancy after retirement are 
important, yet sensitive, variables as these will influence the amount saved, as well as 
the number of periods over which savings can compound.  
The assumption that the individual will experience zero-real earnings growth is 
simplifying. The deductibility of contributions to Regulation 28 compliant funds would 
assist individuals who have higher earnings growth earlier in their career16. Quarterly 
employment statistics (P0277) from Statistics South Africa exist that would assist in 
determining the effect that earnings growth should have on the retirement saving 
behaviour. Consideration thereof, is however beyond the scope of this research.  
The assumption that tax brackets and rebates will increase in line with inflation is 
unrealistic based on the data provided in Appendix D. In reality, individuals would 
need to adjust their savings behaviour to adapt to the variations in, and changes to, 
the tax legislation as and when these are made, as taxation may have a significant 
effect on retirement savings value. Furthermore, the assumption regarding the 
                                                     
16 For example, an individual who moves toward the top tax bracket in the early years of employment 
would receive a bigger tax deduction, resulting in a significantly larger contribution to their regulation 
28 fund, which would result in more time for this capital to grow.  
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increase in the contribution deduction cap is simplifying. The first-time introduction 
of this limit in 2016 means there is no data or evidence to substantiate future 
increases in this limit, which may result in fiscal drag. 
The asset allocation of the discretionary investor is likely to change as that investor 
approaches retirement and begins to diversify his asset allocation to adjust to a lower 
overall risk profile. It is noteworthy that Regulation 28 attempts to mimic this posited 
behaviour by limiting the risk exposure of Regulation 28 compliant funds to attain a 
more moderate risk profile. The exact time point that this takes place will vary from 
investor to investor based on their individual risk appetite. Further, there will come a 
point where the present value of additional nominal returns earned by the 
discretionary investment, compounded over the period remaining until retirement 
will be eclipsed by the present value of the additional contribution as a result of the 
tax benefit received for contributing to the Regulation 28 compliant fund 
compounded over the same period.  
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4. Results  
In this section, the results to the research questions will be presented. After results 
for all three research questions have been presented, the results will be discussed.  
Research Question 1  
What is the differential nominal return that is required from  discretionary, non-
Regulation 28 compliant investments over a career in order to account for the 
tax incentives received by Regulation 28 compliant funds? 
The table below displays the differential returns required by discretionary investment 
over the course of a career. It must be highlighted that the assumptions made in these 
scenarios reflect those described in the method section. Table 1 included on the next 
page reflects the answer to research question 1.  
Table 1 only reflects the variation of one input variable, being the starting annual 
salary. Table 1 reflects the variation of the starting salary, which results in the result 
cells labelled B, C and D. The Goal Seek function in Excel17 was used to determine the 
variable E, such that the result variable labelled G to be equal to that labelled D. Each 
of these labelled variables is explained below table one. 
The best performing Regulation 28 compliant fund had returned an average nominal 
return of 18.49% per annum over a period of 10 years and 10 months. The best 
performing Regulation 28 compliant fund with a total return history of over 12 years 
returned 17.58% per annum over 16 years. Notwithstanding these facts, 18.49% has 
been used in order to impose the least possible prejudice on Regulation 28 compliant 
funds. 
                                                     
17 Goal Seek is a function offered in Microsoft Excel. The functioning of Goal seek is such that it 
performs multiple iterations of a formula by adjusting a selected input value until the target result of 
the formula is met.  
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The results indicate that depending on the tax bracket that the individuals find 
themselves in; the additional return required by the discretionary investor varies. This 
is a result of the provisions of South African Tax legislation, which will result in the 
discretionary investor being taxed on withdrawals as if these are capital gains18, which 
are currently taxed at a maximum effective tax rate of 13.653%19. 
Although the results above provide a satisfactory answer to the research question 
posed, it was deemed prudent to conduct sensitivity analyses using the same model. 
The results of these analyses are contained in Appendix F. 
  
                                                     
18 s9C of the South African Income tax act provides that equity instruments held for a period of more 
than 3 years are deemed to be capital in nature. 
19 Capital gains are included in taxable income at 33.3%, with the maximum marginal tax rate of 41%. 
This results in an effective tax rate of 13.653%. 
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Research Question 2 
Is this return feasible given the historical pe rformance of the South African stock 
market? 
The Johannesburg Stock Exchange All Share Index (‘J203’) was formed in June 2002. 
Consequently, the total return period available is limited to June 2002 to October 
2015, a period of 13 years and 5 months. Data also exist for the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange All Share Capped Index20 (‘J303’), and the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
Shareholder Weighted All Share Index21 (‘J403’). 
When considering this 13-year period, the annual nominal return on the J203 is 
16.23% per annum22. When compared to the best performing Regulation 28 compliant 
fund over the same time period, the Regulation 28 fund returned 15.63% per annum. 
The J303 returned 16.76% per annum and the J403 returned 17.75% per annum over 
the same period.  
Therefore, depending on the tax bracket that an individual is in, it is feasible for an 
individual to achieve annual returns which would make discretionary investment 
beneficial to them. This is the case for individuals in the first two tax brackets if the 
J203 is used, and all individuals if the J303 or J403 are used as discretionary investment 
vehicles.  
Research Question 3  
Is Regulation 28 an appropriate tool for managing investment risk, considering 
the correlation of Regulation 28 compliant fund returns with the JSE and the 
variability of returns as measured by standard deviation ? 
                                                     
20 The All share Capped Index follows the same construction methodology as the all share index and 
only differs with regards to the capping of stock weightings to 10% per stock. 
21 Shareholder Weighted (SWIX) Indices have the same constituents as an existing market capitalisation 
weighted Index. However, all constituents are weighted in the SWIX indices by applying an alternate 
free float, called the SWIX free float. The SWIX free float represents the proportion of a constituent’s 
share capital that is held in dematerialised form and registered on the South African share register, 
maintained by STRATE. The SWIX free float will not exceed the company free float. 
22 Based on a compound annual growth rate.  
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Considering the limitation of the top performing fund identified above23, the top three 
Regulation 28 compliant funds (‘funds”) over the 13 year and 5 month period were 
compared to the Johannesburg Stock Exchange All Share Index. The comparison 
considered the mean annual return over the 13 year period, the standard deviation 
and the correlation between movements in the monthly fund values and the JSE.  
Table 3 shows that discretionary investment surpasses the investments of the 3 best 
performing Regulation 28 funds, as measured by mean annual return, whereas the 
results supra show the same on a compound annual growth basis. Table 3 further 
indicates that the standard deviation of the J203, and thus its return variability, is 
higher than those of the Regulation 28 compliant funds.  
Measure  JSE J203 Fund A Fund B Fund C 
Mean Annual Return 19.589% 17.610% 16.539% 15.892% 
Standard Deviation 19.041% 12.711% 10.301% 10.677% 
Table 3: Mean Returns and Standard Deviation 
  
                                                     
23 The top performing regulation 28 compliant fund had a return history limited to 10 years and was 
therefore excluded from the risk measurement due to having a shorter available return history than 
the J203 Index. 
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Table 4: Correlation 
Discussion 
The initial observation from Table 1 is that the additional nominal return24 required 
by a discretionary investor varies depending on the investor’s particular tax bracket. 
The additional return varies from - 0.85% to a maximum of 1.00% per annum over the 
course of the individuals career. 
 
Figure 1: Additional Returns required over Regulation 28 
What is apparent from Table 1 is that saving for retirement can be an effective vehicle 
to accumulate wealth. Any investment that is earning a return in excess of inflation is 
creating real wealth for the holder. Based on the input assumptions used in the model, 
either individual could be in a position where he would be able to withdraw 
approximately six times their final salary for each of the 20 years of retirement. This is 
                                                     
24 The phrase additional nominal return is used loosely as in some instances investors could have 
reduced returns. 
Correlation JSE J203 Fund A Fund B Fund C 
JSE J203 1    
Fund A 0.189184 1   
Fund B 0.143246 0.874563 1  
Fund C  0.199948 0.935405 0.864439 1 
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not an aberration, as the purpose of the model is to calculate the differential return 
required by discretionary investment in order to be indifferent between regulatory 
investment and discretionary investment. The assumptions used were based on the 
maximum permissible contributions to Regulation 28 compliant funds.   
Whilst saving to withdraw six times the final salary is essentially unrealistic, given the 
human behavioural pitfalls highlighted in the literature review section of this paper, it 
does indicate a potential problem with the current proposals for retirement saving. 
By allowing an individual a tax deduction for contributions to a retirement fund during 
their working career, the legislation essentially defers taxation from the working 
career until retirement. For individuals in the lower tax brackets, this is punitive, as 
their retirement savings value results in a large increase in their disposable income at 
retirement, which results in the individual moving to higher tax brackets, resulting in 
these individuals paying more tax in retirement for behaving exactly as the legislation 
intended. 
Referring to Figure 1, it is shown that discretionary investors in the two lowest tax 
brackets could select investment vehicles, which earn a lower nominal annual return, 
than if they were to choose a Regulation 28 compliant investment. The additional 
nominal return required by the discretionary investor then increases to a peak of 1% 
for an individual in the 5th tax bracket, before decreasing to 0.56% per annum for those 
individuals in the top tax bracket. 
This is troublesome for lower tax-bracket earners, who generally  earn less as a result 
of being unskilled or semi-skilled workers (Burger & Yu, 2006; Hlekiso & Mahlo, 2006)  
These workers are unlikely to possess the financial literacy to understand the 
ramifications of their decisions (Lusardi & Alessie, 2011) and may potentially rely on 
the advice of financial advisors.  
The largest additional nominal returns are required by discretionary investors in the 
fourth and fifth tax brackets respectively. These investors are the ones who fiscal drag 
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affects the most, with the greatest level of drag exhibited as they move from their 
respective tax brackets into the highest marginal tax bracket25. 
Considering the historic returns of the J203, it would be possible for investors in the 
top tax bracket, as well as the lowest two tax brackets to achieve the required rate of 
return for discretionary investment to be a preferred choice on the basis of monetary 
value of retirement. If the investor were to invest to track the J303 or J403, an 
individual in any tax bracket would be able to achieve the required return to make 
discretionary investment the preferred choice. 
Using standard deviation as a measure of risk, it becomes clearer, as shown in table 3, 
that the regulation has resulted in a decrease in the standard deviation of the fund 
returns, indicative of a reduced risk profile. Further, when using the Sharpe ratio 
(Sharpe, 1964) which measures additional return for per unit of risk, all three funds 
perform better than the J203, J303 and J403. 
The purpose of Regulation 28 is to limit any particular fund’s ability to make imprudent 
investment decisions (National Treasury, 2010). It is shown in table 4 that all three 
funds considered show low correlations to movements in the All Share Index. This is a 
good indicator that the limits imposed by Regulation 28 are effective in limiting the 
exposure of the Regulation 28 compliant funds to equities. Table 4 indicates that 
whilst the Regulation 28 compliant funds have low return correlation to the J203, 
these funds returns are highly correlated. A result that may, prima facie, lead to the 
conclusion that these funds are exposed to the same or similar underlying 
investments. A finding that was prominent, was that discretionary investors could 
accumulate between 65.5% and 68.2% of the retirement savings that a regulatory 
investor would require in order to have the same retirement savings withdrawals. This 
indicates that the additional taxes paid by regulatory investors in retirement account 
for approximately 30% to 35% of the total savings value at retirement. This can be 
                                                     
25 An individual in the fifth tax bracket incurs tax at a marginal rate of 39%. When moving into the top 
tax bracket this increases to 41%. This results in a regulatory investor paying an additional 2% tax on 
each of his withdrawals in retirement. This is contrasted to the effective capital gains rate which 
would increase from 12.987% to 13.635%.  
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attributed to the present value of additional tax in retirement outweighing the present 
value of the tax savings during the working career.  
5. Conclusion 
Summary of Results 
It is apparent from the study that smoothing consumption over the life-cycle as 
proposed by the Life-cycle hypothesis would be particularly difficult for the ordinary 
citizen. Determining the amount of wealth needed at retirement, the appropriate 
amount to save in the working years up to retirement and the amount that can be 
safely withdrawn during retirement is a complex multi-variate calculation. This, 
coupled with potential earnings increases, an uncertain retirement date, unexpected 
shocks to consumption and the manifestly uncertain date of death are variables that 
further complicate the matter. This supports the hypothesis proposed by Shefrin and 
Thaler (1988). 
If an individual were to contribute the maximum permissible amount26 to a Regulation 
28 fund in order to save for retirement, this would result in large wealth accumulation, 
deferring taxes to later in the life-cycle. As demonstrated in the method chapter, there 
is a degree of unpredictability in the South African Revenue Services changes to the 
tax rates. Coupled with the South African budget deficit, this may lead one to conclude 
that further tax rate increases will take place in the future. Should this be the case, it 
would increase the quantitative attractiveness of discretionary saving27.  
Whilst it is noted in that only small additional returns would be required to outperform 
Regulation 28 funds, not all discretionary investors would be better off had they 
invested in the JSE All Share Index, as the chosen discretionary investment. Had 
discretionary investors chosen the JSE Shareholder Weighted All Share Index, or the 
                                                     
26 Currently 27.5% of Retirement Funding income as per amendments to the income tax act.  
 
27 Discretionary investment incurs a lower effective tax rate, which means that the amount saved can 
be significantly lower. 
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JSE Capped all Share Index, all discretionary investors, regardless of their tax bracket, 
would be financially better off. 
It is noted that Regulation 28 is an effective tool for regulating the risk that retirement 
savings are subjected to, as the top performing funds showed less volatility as 
measured by standard deviation, and showed a low correlation of returns to 
movements in the JSE All Share Index. An area of concern is the high correlation of the 
fund returns with each other, as this suggests that different retirement saving 
products28 are exposed to very similar, or essentially the same29 investments and 
consequently the same investment risks. 
Conclusion 
The above study indicates that Regulation 28 may be effective at reducing the 
investment risk that an individual’s retirement savings are exposed to; however from 
a quantitative returns perspective, the limits imposed by Regulation 28 may lead to 
sub-optimal investment choices when only quantitative returns are considered, 
should individuals be seeking to reduce their current tax liability by investing in a 
Regulation 28 compliant fund. This imposition is burdens those persons who most 
need retirement funding without an added tax liability occasioned by the deferred tax 
liability traversed above. 
Based on the results of this study, there is initial evidence that discretionary 
investment offers higher returns, which indicates that individuals should opt for 
discretionary investment. However, upon further evaluation of this statement, it is 
worth noting that on a risk-adjusted basis30 there is no evidence to suggest that the 
discretionary investments used in this study outperform the Regulation 28 compliant 
counterparts.  
                                                     
28 Three different regulation 28 compliant funds managed by three different asset managers were 
used. 
29 The same assets but with different levels of exposure 
30 Measured by the Sharpe Ratio (Sharpe, 1994), a measure of excess return per unit of variability in 
the portfolio returns.  
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Accordingly, individuals should invest in order to address their investment goal, which 
may be solely to maximise retirement wealth, in which case discretionary investment 
is preferred. If investors seek to maximise retirement wealth whilst minimising 
possible variability in that wealth, then a Regulation 28 compliant fund may be the 
superior alternative. 
Recommendations and Areas for future research  
As is apparent from the aforegoing, there are a significant number of variables and 
assumptions impacting on the results obtained from this model.  The result is that 
there are numerous areas for further research that will yield further fruitful data to 
guide investment saving for retirement funding.  These several areas for research are 
set out below: 
1. The data used for Regulation 28 compliant funds was limited to publically 
available fund returns, consequently, a number of employer pension and 
provident funds could not be included in the study as no data was available. 
The inclusion of such data may yield results which are contrary to the findings 
noted in this study. 
 
2. The performance both pre- and post-retirement of discretionary investment is 
dependent on tax legislation surrounding the provisions for capital gains tax 
and dividend withholding tax. An analysis of the sensitivity of these results to 
changes in the tax legislation would improve the understanding of the drivers 
of retirement savings value.  
 
3. As noted in the conclusion, the data for investment returns exists for a limited 
period, a period which is shorter than the investment period used over either 
investors working (and saving) career. Consequently, using investment returns 
over a longer time frame may yield different results and would require further 
analysis. The study considered a fixed time period to October 2015 and 
therefore it is possible that this time-frame used is not indicative of investment 
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returns over a different period. It is recommended that varying time-frames 
are used to evaluate whether this is the case.  
 
4. The discretionary investments used in this study are indices on the JSE; these 
indices are not directly investable, however can be accessed via a number of 
index-tracking exchange traded funds. These funds may experience a degree 
of tracking error. An analysis of whether tracking error materially impacts the 
results of this study is needed. 
5. The investment universe available to discretionary investors is not limited to 
index tracking exchange traded funds. Investors would be able to access a 
variety of investments such as multi-asset flexible unit trusts, hedge funds as 
well as offshore investments. It is recommended that this study is replicated 
using returns from these investment products as the returns earned by - and 
return variability of these products may differ significantly from JSE indices 
used. 
 
6. This study used a fixed period for the individuals working career and 
retirement. The time period over which retirement savings accumulate, 
returns are able to compound and retirement savings are utilised will affect 
the results of the study. It is recommended that further analysis of the impact 
these variables have on the results is undertaken.  
 
7. Inflation was assumed to be a constant rate, at the upper bound of the South 
African Reserve bank target range. From the date of retirement, it was 
assumed that the retirement savings would earn a nominal inflationary return. 
Both sensitivity to changes in the rate of inflation, and the returns earned by 
accumulated savings post retirement will impact the results of the study and 
are recommended as areas of future research. 
 
8. Transaction costs were excluded from the study. Transaction costs are 
disclosed for both exchange traded funds and Regulation 28 compliant funds 
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which would assist in determining the effect of transaction costs on retirement 
savings decisions. This is recommended as an area for further investigation.  
 
9. The study assumed that individuals experienced zero real earnings growth 
over the course of their career31. This simplifying assumption can be removed 
using quarterly employment statistics available from StatsSA32. These statistics 
would make it possible to determine average earnings growth in various 
sectors and make it possible to replicate the study using real earnings growth.  
Conducting the further research recommended above would provide data for a meta-
analysis of the manner in which South Africans should save for retirement such that 
they are able to save the required amount with limited investment risk and the ability 
to smooth consumption over their life-cycle, thereby minimising the risk that 
insufficient retirement savings could place an added fiscal burden on the state owing 
to premature exhaustion of retirement savings.  
Based on the findings of this study, individuals should take time to understand their 
risk preferences and set retirement savings goals or objectives. These goals/objectives 
would allow them to make more informed decisions regarding the investment vehicle 
that would enable them to obtain these goals. Individuals should consider variables 
such as life expectancy as well as their potential earnings growth. 
Non-Regulation 28 investment managers and advisers should seek to understand their 
clients’ needs and objectives when providing investment advice; and should actively 
compete with Regulation 28 managers on the basis that they are able to achieve 
                                                     
31 This implies that the only manner an individual would change tax brackets was through the value 
accumulated in their retirement saving vehicle of choice.  
 
32 StatsSA publish a quarterly report (P0277) which includes employment and earnings data. 
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potentially higher returns, possibly on a risk adjusted basis33. These managers should 
seek to educate their potential clients on the tax consequences of investing in a 
Regulation 28 compliant retirement fund, particularly as to the post-retirement tax 
implications which could be life-changing for the individual.  Whilst this study looked 
at a passive index tracking investment as a discretionary alternative, research 
indicates that it is possible for active managers to outperform the index (Petajisto, 
2013). 
Retirement fund trustees and investment managers should engage with regulators to 
better understand the changes in the tax legislation promulgated by the Taxation Laws 
Amendment Act, as these changes do not appear to create any benefit for members, 
other than increased present tax deductions, which are outweighed by the present 
value of future additional taxes. In addition to the foregoing, these trustees and 
managers should investigate, retrospectively, the impact of using an index tracking 
fund as their equity exposure, would have on their historic returns. The results of this 
investigation may prove useful in providing retirement saving advice  to prospective 
clients and  will assist with investment decisions within their respective funds. Further, 
the improved understanding that could be provided by this research, would materially 
assist these stakeholders in engaging the regulatory bodies when it comes to 
modifying existing – or drafting new legislation.   
                                                     
33 This would require an analysis of the returns and risk adjusted performance of non-regulation 28 
compliant investments, which was beyond the scope of this research.  
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Appendix A – Limits in terms of Regulation 28  
The below table highlights the limits for Regulation 28 funds, the column on the right 
represents the total percentage of assets that can be invested in that asset class; the 
column second from the right represents the maximum percentage of that asset class 
that can be held with any one entity or issuer.  
 
 Regulation 28 Limits 
Item Categories of assets Limits being the maximum 
percentage of aggregate fair 
value of total assets of fund 
Per 
issuer/entity, 
as applicable 
For all 
issuers/ 
entities 
1. CASH 100% 
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1.1 Notes and coins; any balance or deposit in an account held with a South African 
bank;  
 
A money market instrument issued by a South African bank including an Islamic 
liquidity management financial instrument;  
 
Any positive net balance in a margin account with an exchange; and 
 
Any positive net balance in a settlement account with an exchange, operated 
for the buying and selling of assets. 
25% 100% 
1.2 Any balance or deposit held with a foreign bank; 
 
A money market instrument issued by a foreign bank including an Islamic 
liquidity management financial instrument; 
5%   
2. DEBT INSTRUMENTS INCLUDING ISLAMIC DEBT INSTRUMENTS 100% for debt 
instruments issued 
by or guaranteed by 
the Republic, 
otherwise 
75% 
2.1 Inside the Republic and foreign assets 
  (a) Debt instruments issued by, and loans to, the government of the 
Republic, and any debt or loan guaranteed by the Republic 
  100% 
(b) Debt instruments issued or guaranteed by the government of a foreign 
country 
10%   
(c) Debt instruments issued or guaranteed by a South 
African bank against its balance sheet: - 
  75% 
  (i) listed on an exchange with an issuer market capitalisation of 
R20 billion or more, or an amount or conditions as prescribed 
25%   
    (ii) listed on an exchange with an issuer market capitalisation of 
between R2 billion and R20 billion, or an amount or conditions 
as prescribed 
15%   
(iii) listed on an exchange with an issuer market capitalisation of 
less than R2 billion, or an amount or conditions as prescribed 
10% 
(iv) not listed on an exchange 5% 25% 
66 
 
  (d) Debt instruments issued or guaranteed by an entity that has equity 
listed on an exchange, or debt instruments issued or guaranteed by a 
public entity under the Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (Act No. 
1 of 1999) as prescribed: - 
10% 50% 
  (i) listed on an exchange 10% 50% 
  (ii) not listed on an exchange 5% 25% 
(e) Other debt instruments: - 5% 25% 
(i) listed on an exchange 5% 25% 
(ii) not listed on an exchange 5% 15% 
3. EQUITIES 75% 
3.1 Inside the Republic and foreign assets   
  (a) Preference and ordinary shares in companies, excluding shares in 
property companies, listed on an exchange: - 
  75% 
(i) issuer market capitalisation of R20 billion or more, or an 
amount or conditions as prescribed 
15%   
(ii) issuer market capitalisation of between R2 billion and R20 
billion, or an amount or conditions as prescribed 
10% 
(iii) issuer market capitalisation of less than R2 billion, or an 
amount or conditions as prescribed 
5% 
(b) Preference and ordinary shares in companies, excluding shares in 
property companies, not listed on an exchange 
2.5% 10% 
4. IMMOVABLE PROPERTY 25% 
4.1 Inside the Republic and foreign assets   
  (a) Preference shares, ordinary shares and linked units comprising shares 
linked to debentures in property companies, or units in a Collective 
Investment Scheme in Property, listed on an exchange:- 
  25% 
(i) issuer market capitalisation of R10 billion or more, or an 
amount or conditions as prescribed 
15%   
(ii) issuer market capitalisation of between R3 billion and R10 
billion, or an amount or conditions as prescribed 
10% 
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(iii) issuer market capitalisation of less than R3 billion, or an 
amount or conditions as prescribed 
5% 
(b) Immovable property, preference and ordinary shares in property 
companies, and linked units comprising shares linked to debentures in 
property companies, not listed on an exchange 
5% 15% 
5. COMMODITIES   10% 
5.1 Inside the Republic and foreign assets   
  (a) Kruger Rands and other commodities listed on an exchange, including 
exchange traded commodities: 
- 
  10% 
    (i) gold 10%   
(ii) each other commodity 5%   
6. INVESTMENTS IN THE BUSINESS OF A PARTICIPATING EMPLOYER INSIDE THE REPUBLIC 
IN TERMS OF: - 
  
  (a) section 19(4) of the Pension Funds Act 5% 
(b) To the extent it has been allowed by an exemption in terms of section 19(4A) of the 
Pension Funds Act 
10% 
7. HOUSING LOANS GRANTED TO MEMBERS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF 
SECTION 19(5) 
95% 
8. HEDGE FUNDS, PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS AND ANY OTHER ASSET NOT REFERRED TO IN 
THIS SCHEDULE 
15% 
8.1 Inside the Republic and foreign assets   
  (a) Hedge funds 10% 
(i) Funds of hedge funds 5% per fund of 
hedge funds 
  
(ii) Hedge funds 2.5% per hedge 
fund 
(b) Private equity funds   10% 
(i) Funds of private equity funds 5% per fund of 
private 
equity funds 
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(ii) Private equity funds 2.5% per 
private equity 
fund 
(c) Other assets not referred to in this schedule and excluding a hedge 
fund or private equity fund 
  2.5% 
Source: Regulation 28 that gives effect to  36(1)(BB) of the Pension Funds Act 1956, 2010 (National 
Treasury, 2011) 
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Appendix B – Summary of changes to Regulation 28 
Table drafted by author 
Asset Class Limit under 2011 
Regulation 28 
Limit under 
original 
Regulation 28 
   
Equities 75% 75% 
Immoveable Property 25% 25% 
Equity and property collectively  No explicit limit 90% 
Sponsoring Employer  5-10% 5% 
Any single bank 25% 20% 
Off-shore Investments Included per 
asset class 
15% 
      
Other Assets (including derivatives, hedge funds, 
private equity) 
15% 2.5% 
Money Market Instruments 100% 100% 
RSA Government Fixed Income Instruments 100% 100% 
Commodities 10% Not mentioned 
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Appendix C – Illustrative Examples 
Note: These are simple illustrative examples 
Example 1 – Reduced Tax Liability 
A and B are hypothetical identical individuals. Both have a pre-tax income of  
R1 000 000 per annum. A opts to contribute 27.5% of his pre-tax salary to a Regulation 
28 compliant pension fund. B opts to invest 27.5% of his pre-tax salary in local equities. 
The effect of this is that A will receive a deduction against his total income, whereas B 
will not.  The result is that person B will have less disposable income at year-end.  
Assume further that the local equities have a nominal return 15% per annum, whereas 
the Regulation 28 fund only earns a 10% return in the same year. For the sake of this 
illustration, we assume that the investment was made at the beginning of the financial 
year for both parties. Both parties are in the same income tax bracket – thus are taxed 
R208 587 + 40% of any amount exceeding R701 300 per the 2015/2016 tax regulations. 
At year-end we compare total assets assuming that tax has been paid in full. The result 
is that A has higher total assets, primarily as a result of having to pay less tax.  This is 
illustrated below.  
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Example 1   Person A    Person B  
Pre Tax Salary A  R            1 000 000.00     R       1 000 000.00  
Savings B 27.5%   27.5% 
Permissible Deductions A x B = C  R               275 000.00     R                             -    
Taxable Income A - C = D   R               725 000.00     R       1 000 000.00  
Tax liability E  R               215 304.00     R           328 054.00  
Disposable Income D - E = F  R               509 696.00     R           396 946.00  
Total Investment made 
G = A x 
B 
 R               275 000.00     R           275 000.00  
Annual Return H 10%   15% 
Year End Investments 
J = G x 
(1 + H) 
 R               302 500.00  
  
 R           316 250.00  
Total Assets (Disposable 
Income + Investments) 
F + J  R               812 196.00  
  
 R           713 196.00  
Total Difference    R                  99 000.00      
Calculation E 
Tax range per 2016 taxable income table (South African Revenue Service, 2015) 
Taxable Income  Tax Due 
R701 300 and above R208 587 + 41% of the amount above R701 300 
 
Person A = R208 587 + [R23 700 x 41%] = R215 304 
Person B = R208 587 + [R298 700 x 41%] = R328 054 
 
Example 2 – Increased Contribution 
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Assume the facts are the same as in example one, except that investor B reduces his 
investment amount such that himself and investor A have the same after tax 
disposable income.  
Example 2   Person A    Person B  
Pre Tax Salary A  R            1 000 000.00     R       1 000 000.00  
Savings B 27.5%   16.2% 
Permissible Deductions A x B = C  R               275 000.00     R                             -    
Taxable Income A - C = D   R               725 000.00     R       1 000 000.00  
Tax liability E  R               215 304.00     R           328 054.00  
Disposable Income D - E = F  R               509 696.00     R           509 696.00  
Total Investment made 
G = A x 
B 
 R               275 000.00     R           162 250.00  
Annual Return H 10%   15% 
Year End Investments 
J = G x 
(1 + H) 
 R               302 500.00  
  
 R           186 587.50  
Total Assets (Disposable 
Income) + Investments) 
F + J  R               812 196.00  
  
 R           696 283.50  
Total Difference    R               115 912.50      
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Appendix D – Taxation Statistics 
Source: South African Revenue Services 
Historic income tax bracket increases 
The below tables 5 and 6 detail the percentage increase in the lower bound of each 
tax bracket from 2006 to 2016. The functioning of tax brackets is such that the upper 
bound of the first bracket will form the lower bound of the second bracket and 
therefore it is not necessary to show both. 
 
Tax Bracket Increases 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
First Bound Increase 8.11% 25.00% 12.50% 8.44% 8.20% 6.06% 
Second Bound Increase 13.04% 23.08% 12.50% 8.33% 7.69% 5.24% 
Third Bound Increase 16.13% 22.22% 13.64% 8.00% 7.41% 5.17% 
Final Bound Increase 17.95% 30.43% 16.67% 8.57% 7.89% 4.88% 
Table 5: Tax bracket increases 2006 - 2011 
Tax Bracket Increases 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
First Bound Increase 7.14% 6.67% 3.50% 5.40% 4.21% 
Second Bound Increase 6.33% 6.38% 3.50% 5.39% 4.18% 
Third Bound Increase 6.56% 6.46% 3.50% 5.40% 4.17% 
Final Bound Increase 5.81% 6.37% 3.50% 5.40% 4.19% 
Table 6: Tax bracket increases 2012-2016 
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Figure 2: Tax bracket increases graphical representation 
Historic income tax rebate increases 
The below tables 7, 8 detail the percentage increase in each tax rebate from 2006 to 
2016. All citizens under the age of 65 are entitled to the primary rebate; those 
between 65 and 75 are entitled to a secondary rebate and those over 75 are entitled 
to the tertiary rebate. The tertiary rebate was introduced in 2012. 
Tax Rebate Increases 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Primary Rebate 8.6% 14.3% 7.5% 7.0% 17.8% 5.2% 
Secondary Rebate 40.6% 0.0% 4.0% 7.7% 7.1% 5.1% 
Tertiary Rebate 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Table 7: Tax rebate increases 2006-2011 
Tax Rebate Increases 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Primary Rebate 4.8% 6.4% 5.6% 5.3% 4.2% 
Secondary Rebate 5.9% 6.3% 5.6% 5.3% 4.2% 
Tertiary Rebate 0.0% 6.5% 5.6% 5.2% 4.2% 
Table 8: Tax rebate increases 2012-2016 
0.00%
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20.00%
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Figure 3: Tax rebate increases graphical representation 
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Appendix E – Retirement Fund Returns Example 
Note: This is a simple il lustrative example of compounding returns.  
Assume investor A earns a salary of R150 000 per annum. This salary increases by 10% 
in each year for 5 years. Investor A contributes 27.5% of his pre-tax salary to a 
Regulation 28 compliant fund, which earns a nominal return of 15% per annum. For 
the sake of simplicity, the investments are assumed to take place at the end of the 
year. The below example illustrates the value of his savings at each of the years 
included in this example.  
 
Variable Year 1 2 3 4 5 
Salary   R      150 000   R      165 000   R      181 500   R      199 650   R      219 615  
       
Contributions 
to Fund 
27.50%  R         41 250   R         45 375   R         49 913   R         54 904   R         60 394  
       
Savings opening 
value 
  R                 -     R         41 250   R         92 813   R      156 647   R      235 048  
Investment 
Return 
15.00%   R           6 188   R         13 922   R         23 497   R         35 257  
Current Year 
Savings 
  R         41 250   R         45 375   R         49 913   R         54 904   R         60 394  
Savings closing 
Value 
  R         41 250   R         92 813   R      156 647   R      235 048   R      330 699  
Table 9: Retirement Savings compounding and value 
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